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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOSEPH K. KRUEGER and MARY A 
SAWYERS, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(d)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: As a matter of law, may journalists covering a story on the dangers of chewing 
tobacco be criminally prosecuted under Utah's contributing to the delinquency of minors 
statute for allegedly asking 17-year-old high school students to "chew" on camera1 where 
the journalists did not provide the tobacco, and the students already possessed and were 
predisposed to use chewing tobacco? 
1
 Defendants deny asking the students to chew tobacco. However, for the purpose of 
their Motion to Dismiss, defendants assumed the state's contention that the students would 
testify that Sawyers and ICrueger asked them to chew for purposes of obtaining videotape of 
the students' use of chewing tobacco. 
CaseNo.9800035-CA 
Priority No. 10 
This issue was preserved in appellants' Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss, R. at 30-55, and during the hearing on the Motion, R. at 153. 
Standard of Review: The district court's interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
that this Court reviews without deference. State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995) 
("The standard of review for a simple legal interpretation of a rule or statute is correctness."). 
Issue: If journalists may be prosecuted under the statute for the news gathering 
activities involved here, is the statute unconstitutional as applied under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 7 and 15 
of the Utah Constitution? 
This issue was preserved in appellants' Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss, R. at 30-55, and during the hearing on the Motion, R. at 153. 
Standard of Review: The district court's decision on constitutional questions is 
reviewed by this Court without deference. State v. Arbon. 909 P.2d 1270, 1271 (Utah App. 
1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. Const, amend. I 
U.S. Const amend. XIV 
Utah Const, art. I, § 15 
2 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-801(l ) (a) (1996) 
lHali I Vile Ann !j / » III l<)> i \WM 
Utah Code X iim §76-2 101 (19S 5; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1995) 
All constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the resolution of the 
issues before this Cc i it I: ai e : en itained ii l tl i.e Addendum to this br ief 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E C A S E 
A. Nature of the Proceedings. 
This is an appeal from interlocutory orders of the Honorable Bryce K. Bryner, Seventh 
Informations charging them with violating Utah Code Ami § 78-3a-801(1 )(a) (1996) — 
contributing to the delinquency of minors. 
B. The Course of the Proceedings. 
On May 2, 199 7 < V r V , •- .- «": ~ -> •* - * 
alleging that appellants Joseph K. Krueger and Mary Ann Sawyers each violated Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3a-801(l)(a) (1996). The charges arise from interviews these two journalists 
the school. Sawyers and Krueger entered not guilty pleas on J unc 17, 1^9 7. 
3 
Sawyers and Krueger timely filed a Motion to Dismiss the Informations. Oral 
argument was heard on November 3,1997. In support of their Motion, Sawyers and Krueger 
argued that the Informations should be dismissed principally for three reasons. First, 
Sawyers and Krueger did not have the requisite intent to violate the statute because they 
interacted with the students solely for the purpose of gathering information and videotaped 
pictures for a news story. Second, their alleged conduct did not violate the statute. Third, the 
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Sections 15 of the Utah Constitution 
prohibit criminal prosecution of journalists for the news gathering activities involved here. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Bryner dismissed one count of the Informations 
which concerned a student who was 18 years old at the time of the interviews and, 
accordingly, not a minor. On January 2,1998, Judge Bryner issued a written ruling denying 
in part and granting in part appellants' Motion to Dismiss. This Court granted Sawyers' and 
Krueger's Petition for Interlocutory Appeal. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
On February 18, 1997, Richard L. Bender, a self-described "victim" of "smokeless" 
or "chewing" tobacco, appeared at Carbon High School in Price, Utah, to speak to students 
as part of the school's effort to discourage the use of chewing tobacco. R. at 60. 
Prior to the assembly, Rebecca Murphy, an employee of the Utah Department of 
Health (UDOH), which sponsored Bender's lecture tour at numerous Utah schools, invited 
media organizations to attend and cover Bender's presentation. R. at 95-96. 
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KTVX, Channel 4, received the invitation and assigned appellants to cover Bender's 
presentation. Sawyers, an award-winning news reporter for KTVX, assigned to cover health 
and medical topics, and KI V X cameraman Krueger arrived at Carbon High School shortly 
and asked her to try to locate students who used chewing tobacco and would be willing to be 
interviewed. Sawyers wanted to interview those students to determine the impact of 
Bender's presentation on tl le students who used chewing tobacco, R at 1 2 
identified two students, both of whom said they used chewing tobacco and agreed to be 
interviewed by Channel 4. R. at 60, 72, 
Saw y ersandK n n «.. . . assembly, filmed Bender's entire presentation and 
interviewed Bender aboir 3 ^xnern: ^ n- -Au \ * % ' 
explained to students how he began using chewing tobacco at age 12. At age 26, he was 
diagnosed with cancer, Over the next four years, Bender underwent a series of surgical 
third of his tongue, half of his jaw and 25 percent of the use in his right arm. He told the 
students he nearly died. R. at 73; see "Quit Dippin'" (KTVX, Channel 4, television 
broadcast, February 1 '• s a true and correct videotaped copy of which was submitted 
tothedistri 1. 
5 
After the assembly, Sawyers and Krueger met with the two students identified by Ms. 
Ferguson as users of chewing tobacco. The two, the minors identified in Counts I and II of 
the Informations, told Sawyers they did use chewing tobacco. Sawyers asked the students 
where and when they chewed tobacco. They said they used chewing tobacco in the school 
parking lot during lunch. She asked if they planned to chew that day, and they said they did. 
She then asked the students if they would be willing to be filmed and interviewed. They 
agreed. R. at 63. 
Sawyers and Krueger accompanied the two boys to the high school parking lot where 
they met other students who also said they used chewing tobacco and wanted to be 
interviewed. As they talked, some of the students produced cans of chewing tobacco and 
began chewing. Id In their statements to police, some of the students claimed that Sawyers 
and Krueger asked them to chew tobacco on camera and told them that they would not get 
in trouble for doing so. R. at 61-62, 65-70, 79-81, 83-85.2 
The State does not allege that the journalists provided chewing tobacco to the 
students. R. at 153, p. 28.3 Nor does the State allege that any non-user was asked to chew 
2
 Sawyers and Krueger told the police, and adamantly assert, that they did not ask the 
students to chew tobacco. Rather, appellants maintain that they only asked the students to 
do what they would ordinarily do. R. at 62-63. As noted above, however, for purposes of 
their Motion and this appeal, defendants assume that some of the students would testify that 
appellants asked them to chew tobacco for the camera. 
3
 Because the transcript of the November 3, 1997, hearing before the district court is 
designated by a single number in the record, the individual page numbers will be cited for 
the convenience of the Court. 
6 
tobacco I d In fact, as the news story made clear, those w h o were interview cd habitual 
users. I d ; see also R at I 34. 3 31. 
The story, broadcast that evening, featured excerpts from Bender's lecture and 
included footage o f the students chewing tobacco and comments from the students w h o 
stated that although Bender's presentation caused them some concerns about the dangers of 
( .. mg tobacco, they had no immediate plans to quit: R at 134, 3 3 1 . 
] n:--of the s tudents w h o were filmed I i e v or R obe i its Pi: av is Wilberg, R yari I .ee, 
and Mike Andrieni, all age 1 / were issued "Tobacco Citations" by Carbon High School 
and referred to Seventh District Juvenile Court for violation o f Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-105 
(1996), w hieli prol libits tl le possession of cigars, cigarettes or tobacco by minors. K > -
90. One student, Tyler Minchey, was issued a citation for tl :ie same violatioi I a " :> 
appear in Carbon County Justice Court, apparently because he was 18 years old at the t ime 
o f the incident and not subject to juvenile court jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-
1 
On M a y 2, 1997, the Carbon County Attorney filed two f ive-count Informations 
al leging that Sawyers and Krueger violated Utah Code Ann. § 78 -3a -801 ( l ) (a ) (1996) . R. 
at 3-4 S a \ \ \ e i s jiiil I'uiUi :.... i iii <..l l ilisinr. * Ilk1 ln lonnulu us. U »il .l1 '-1 Judge Bryner 
heard oral arguments on November '!, I^>"' During tli I IUMIIIIL', I IK- ' f . i tbon <'miniy 
Attorney made a number o f significant concessions. First, the State conceded that the only 
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crime that the students could be charged with was possession of tobacco because there is no 
statute specifically outlawing the use of chewing tobacco on school grounds. R. at 153, pp. 
25-26. Second, the State conceded that all of the students who were filmed already had 
chewing tobacco in their possession and that Sawyers and Krueger did not provide tobacco 
to any of them. R. at 153, p. 28. Third, the State conceded that it has the burden of proving 
that Sawyers and Krueger acted intentionally or knowingly in order to be convicted of 
violating the statute. R. at 153, p. 4. Finally, the State stipulated to the dismissal of Count 
4 of the Informations because the student named in that count, Tyler Minchey, was not a 
minor and, therefore, his conduct could not constitute the basis for a contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor charge. R. at 153, p. 3. 
By order dated January 2, 1998, Judge Bryner granted in part and denied in part 
appellants' Motion to Dismiss. First, the district court agreed that the journalists could not 
be prosecuted under subsection (i) of the statute making it a crime to solicit, request, 
command, encourage, or intentionally aid or "act[] with a minor in the violation of any 
federal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance," Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-801(l)(a)(i), 
because the offense with which the students were charged was possession, and the State did 
not contend Sawyers or Krueger provided the tobacco. However, Judge Bryner ruled that 
Sawyers and Krueger could be prosecuted under subsection (ii) of the statute which prohibits 
an adult from doing any act "which tends to cause minors to become or remain delinquent; 
8 
. . . " Id., § 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii). The district court also rejected, without analysis, appellants' 
claim that the statute was unconstitutional, as applied. R. at 139-140. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Journalists engaged in the process of gathering and reporting the news cannot be 
prosecuted for contributing to the delinquency of minors under the circumstances of this 
case. First, as a matter of law, the journalists did not violate the terms of the statute. They 
did not provide the tobacco to the students and they did not induce any non-user to begin 
using chewing tobacco. Nor did they have the criminal intent necessary to violate the statute. 
Second, prosecuting Sawyers and Krueger for contributing to the delinquency of minors 
would violate constitutional free speech and free press guarantees. As applied here, § 78-3a-
801(l)(a)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague and otherwise invalid under the First Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INFORMATIONS MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE SAWYERS 
AND KRUEGER DID NOTHING TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE 
DELINQUENCY OF MINORS 
A. Sawyers and Krueger Did Not Contribute to the Students' Possession of 
Tobacco 
Sawyers and Krueger cannot be prosecuted under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-801(l)(a) 
because their actions do not come within the statutory definitions of the offense. The statute 
is violated when any person 18 years or older 
9 
(i) solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids 
o r . . . acts with a minor in the violation of any federal, state, or 
local law or municipal ordinance; [or] 
(ii) tends to cause minors to become or remain delinquent;... 
Sawyers and Krueger argued, and the district court agreed, that subsection (i) cannot 
apply to their alleged conduct because they did nothing to contribute to the violation of law 
with which the students were charged. The students each were charged with violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-105 (1995), which states: 
Any person under the age of 19 years who buys, accepts, or has in his 
possession any cigar, cigarette, or tobacco in any form is guilty of a Class C 
misdemeanor. 
(Emphasis added). The State admits that Sawyers and Krueger did not supply or in any way 
further or facilitate the purchase, receipt or possession of tobacco by the students. Indeed, 
there is no dispute that the students already were in possession of the chewing tobacco before 
Sawyers and Krueger arrived on the scene. See R. at 139-140; R. at 153, p. 28. Thus, it is 
simply not possible for the reporters to have solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, 
or intentionally aided or acted with the students in violation of § 76-10-105. 
Subsection (ii) cannot apply to Sawyers or Krueger because the "delinquency" alleged 
is the students' possession of chewing tobacco. Again, because Sawyers and Krueger did 
nothing to facilitate the possession of tobacco by the students, they cannot be convicted of 
doing an act that "tends to cause minors to become or remain delinquent." 
10 
The district court erroneously rejected this argument, ruling that although Sawyers and 
Krueger could not be prosecuted under section (i) because they did nothing to facilitate the 
possession of chewing tobacco, they could nonetheless be prosecuted under section (ii) of 
the statute because their alleged actions could tend "to cause minors to become or remain 
delinquent." As argued in section II. below, subsection (ii), so interpreted, is void because 
it would be unconstitutionally vague as applied to Sawyers and Krueger. 
B. As a Matter of Law, Sawyers and Krueger Did Not Have the Mental State 
Required To Violate the Statute 
Sawyers and Krueger cannot be convicted of contributing to the delinquency of 
minors because they did not have the intent necessary to commit the crime. A defendant 
cannot be convicted of a crime without some level of criminal intent. Under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-101 (1995), 
[n]o person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct is 
prohibited by law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with 
criminal negligence, or with a mental state otherwise specified 
in the statute defining the offense, as the definition of the 
offense requires;. . . 
During argument on appellants' Motion to Dismiss, the State conceded that it must 
prove that the journalists acted intentionally or knowingly to obtain convictions. R. at 153, 
p. 4. According to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1995), 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect 
to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when 
11 
it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his 
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is 
aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. 
A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a 
result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is 
reasonably certain to cause the result. 
Sawyers and Krueger cannot be held criminally liable for being present when minors 
were violating state law.4 Moreover, even assuming, as appellants do for the purpose of 
their Motion and for this appeal, that Sawyers and Krueger suggested that the students chew 
the tobacco already in their possession, the journalists still cannot be criminally liable 
because their intent was not to tempt minors to illegal conduct, but rather to cover a news 
story thoroughly. 
News reporting, we can assume, no matter how explicit it is in 
its description or depiction of criminal activity, could never 
serve as a basis for aiding and abetting liability consistent with 
the First Amendment. It will be self-evident in the context of 
news reporting, if nowhere else, that neither the intent of the 
4
 See Ronald M. v. White. 169 Cal. Rptr. 370, 372 (1980) (Carr, J., concurring) 
(defendant who was in presence of minor who had alcohol or drug paraphernalia in his 
possession, and fails to intervene, cannot be liable for contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor); State v. Grove. 486 P.2d 615, 617 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971) ("If, from the evidence, it 
may be inferred that defendant was present when the juvenile engaged in his admitted 
activities with marijuana, there is no evidence that defendant had anything to do with these 
activities; no evidence that defendant approved of such activities. In the absence of such 
evidence, an inference that defendant was present when the juvenile engaged in his marijuana 
activities is insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for contributing to the delinquency 
of the juvenile."); Gray v. State. 233 N.E.2d 468, 469-70 (Ind. 1968) (defendant's mere 
presence at beer party at which minors were drinking does not constitute contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor). 
12 
reporter nor the purpose of the report is to facilitate repetition of 
the crime, or other conduct reported upon, but, rather merely to 
report on the particular event, and thereby to inform the public. 
Rice v. Paladin Enterprises. Inc.. 128 F.3d 233, 266 (4th Cir. 1997), cert, denied. 66 
U.S.L.W. 3686 (1998). In short, journalists in the process of reporting the news do not have 
the intent necessary to aid and abet the commission of a crime. 
Sawyers and Krueger did not knowingly or intentionally do anything that tended "to 
cause minors to become or remain delinquent." The journalists did not create or fabricate 
the story. Obviously, the problem of the use of chewing tobacco by minors already existed; 
that was the reason Carbon High officials decided to sponsor Bender's presentation. The 
journalists' only intent was to cover thoroughly a news event about the efforts to convince 
teenagers of the dangers of using chewing tobacco. To do so, it was essential that Sawyers 
and Krueger not merely recount Bender's presentation, but also to gauge its impact on 
students. 
Sawyers and Krueger had a responsibility to determine whether such anti-tobacco 
efforts are impacting those most at risk — high school students currently using tobacco. To 
that end, it was logical, proper and professionally necessary to interview students who 
chewed tobacco to determine whether Bender's presentation had the desired effect.5 What 
5
 In fact, it would have been a deviation from journalistic standards if Sawyers and 
Krueger had not interviewed the students. One of the most basic tenets of journalism is to 
attempt to report all relevant sides of any story. See, e.g.. In re United Press Int'l. 1989 U.S. 
Dist LEXIS 13927 (D. D.C.), **25, n.18 ("[T]he more factually involved and one-sided a 
report is, the greater becomes the reporter's obligation to report both sides of the story."); 
13 
the journalists discovered is that for the students interviewed even the possibility of 
permanent disfigurement or death is not enough incentive to quit. This is a critical aspect of 
the story. 
Sawyers and Krueger cannot be held liable under Utah law. They were invited to 
Carbon High School as professional journalists. Even assuming that the students were 
correct - which they are not - in stating that Sawyers and Krueger asked them to chew for 
the camera, the interactions among Sawyers, Krueger and the students must be viewed within 
the context of broadcast journalists interviewing news sources.6 The process of collecting 
Dalheim v. KDFW-TV. 706 F. Supp. 493, 497 (N.D. Tex. 1988) ("[Reporters attempt to 
present a balanced story in which both sides are given a fair opportunity forcefully to 
articulate their position in their own words."), affd Dalheim v. KDFW-TV. 918 F.2d 1220 
(5th Cir.1990); Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell 333 F. Supp. 582, 590 (D. D.C. 1971) 
("The theory of free speech is grounded on the belief that people will make the right choice 
if presented with all points of view on a controversial issue."), affd Capital Broadcasting Co. 
v. Acting Attorney Gen.. 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). 
6
 During oral argument on appellants' Motion to Dismiss, the Carbon County 
Attorney suggested that the reporters "orchestrated" the story and implied that the reporters' 
actions encouraged or glamorized the use of chewing tobacco. See R. at 153, p. 28-30. 
These contentions are both factually baseless and legally and constitutionally irrelevant. 
First, this was not an "orchestrated" or fabricated story. Carbon High School students 
use chewing tobacco. The very fact that Carbon High officials devoted school time for an 
assembly for Bender's presentation demonstrates that the school officials, laudably, 
acknowledge they have this serious public health problem. And the fact that Ms. Ferguson, 
the administration representative, could and readily did identify for Sawyers and Krueger 
students who were users of chewing tobacco further underscores the reality of the problem 
of student-use of chewing tobacco at Carbon High. The scene depicted in the videotape of 
the students using chewing tobacco in the school parking lot during lunch was not fiction. 
It is a scene likely replayed on most school days in most high school parking lots, including 
Carbon High's. The students themselves told the reporters that they used chewing tobacco 
during the lunch break in the school parking lot. 
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visual images to illustrate the story is essential to television journalism and, accordingly, 
entitled to First Amendment protections. 
The adage that "one picture is worth a thousand words" reflects 
the common-sense understanding that illustrations are an 
extremely important form of expression for which there is no 
genuine substitute . . . [A] statute that substantially abridges a 
uniquely valuable form of expression of this kind cannot be 
defended on the ground that . . . the speaker can express the 
same ideas in some other way. 
Regan v. Time. Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 677 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
Of course, the Constitution does not insulate reporters from all criminal liability. But 
the culpable mental state necessary for Sawyers and Krueger to violate the statute requires 
that they do more than what the State alleges — suggest that the students chew tobacco for 
the camera — especially when it is undisputed that the students already possessed the 
chewing tobacco and that they had used chewing tobacco for some time prior to the 
interviews. The two journalists cannot be prosecuted for thoroughly reporting on an 
Second, while journalistic attention to those engaged in hazardous or unlawful 
activities may "encourage" or "glamorize" the activities to some of those so engaged, it 
obviously is untenable to punish journalists for this assumed incidental effect of their 
reporting the news. Whatever the psychological effect news coverage has on those engaged 
in crime or unhealthy activities, the public needs — and has a constitutional right — to know 
about criminal or unhealthy activities, particularly when children are involved. Reporters 
covering these stories, constitutionally and legally, cannot be held liable "even if, in some 
circumstances, [news media coverage] incidentally glamorizes and thereby indirectly 
promotes such conduct." Paladin. 128 F.3d at 266. 
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important public health issue.7 As the Paladin court stated: "News reporting, we can assume, 
no matter how explicit it is in its description or depiction of criminal activity, could never 
serve as a basis for aiding and abetting liability consistent with the First Amendment." WL, 
128 F.3d at 266. The charges against Sawyers and Krueger must be dismissed. 
II. PROSECUTING SAWYERS AND KRUEGER FOR VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-3a-801 WOULD VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONS OF 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATE OF UTAH 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii), as Applied in This 
Case, is Unconstitutionally Vague. 
As applied to Sawyers and Krueger, § 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague. 
Due process requires that a law give an ordinarily intelligent person reasonable notice of 
what is prohibited so that he or she may govern his or her actions accordingly. Grayned v. 
City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).8 The vagueness doctrine also requires that the 
law provide explicit standards for those who apply it. As the Supreme Court stated in 
Grayned: 
7
 Reporters regularly publish and broadcast stories about efforts to keep minors from 
engaging in illegal activities. These stories frequently feature interviews with minors 
involved in the illegal activities and show them breaking the law. See, e ^ , Joseph Bauman, 
Youth find many ways to frustrate the law. Deseret News, August 2,1997, at Al (news story 
about underage smokers, some of whom were interviewed and photographed while smoking). 
R. at 98. 
8A statute is void for vagueness "unless it defines the area of illegal conduct with 
sufficient specificity so that 'men of common intelligence [need not] guess at its meaning . 
. . ' " Hiettv. United States. 415 F.2d 664, 670 (5th Cir. 1969) (quoting Connally v. General 
Constr. Co.. 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)), cert, denied. United States v. Hiett 397 U.S. 936 
(1970). 
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A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to 
policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and 
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application. 
Id. at 108-09. Laws failing to meet these criteria are unconstitutional. Id 
The First Amendment, as well as Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution,9 
provide an independent source of the vagueness doctrine. 
Vague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity. When 
First Amendment rights are involved, we look even more closely 
lest, under the guise of regulating conduct that is reachable by 
the police power, freedom of speech and of the press suffer. 
Ashton v. Kentucky. 384 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1966).10 Where First Amendment rights are 
concerned, the "'premise [is] that [precision] of regulation must be the touchstone . . .'" 
Interstate Circuit. Inc. v. Citv of Dallas. 390 U.S. 676, 682 (1968) (quoting NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)).11 
9
 Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution, which reads in part "No law shall be 
passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press . . ." provides at least as 
much protection as the First Amendment. KUTV. Inc. v. Conder. 668 P.2d 513 (Utah 1983). 
10
 See Smith v. California. 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) ("[Stricter] standards of 
permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting 
effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free 
dissemination of ideas may be the loser."). 
11
 The significance of a free press to our democratic society need not be belabored 
here. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize the values at issue in this case. As Justice 
Sutherland stated: "A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the 
government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves." Grosjean v. 
American Press Co.. 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). Moreover, as Justice Black noted in the 
"Pentagon Papers" case: "In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press 
the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to 
17 
Even statutes with the laudable goal of protecting children must pass Constitutional 
scrutiny. Protecting minors is obviously an important state interest; however, "[t]he 
permissible extent of vagueness is not directly proportional to, or a function of, the extent of 
the power to regulate or control expression with respect to children." Interstate Circuit. 390 
U.S. at 689. Free speech and free press protections prevail over the state's interest in 
protecting juveniles. See, &&, Smith v. Dailv Mail Publishing Co.. 443 U.S. 97,104 (1979) 
(First Amendment right of newspaper to publish name of juvenile offender outweighs state's 
interest in protecting the identities of juvenile offenders). When First Amendment rights are 
at stake, a state "may not use a vague and imprecise 'contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor' statute to protect its minors . . . . " Entertainment Ventures. Inc. v. Brewer. 306 F. 
Supp. 802, 820 (M.D. Ala. 1969). 
In Entertainment Ventures, prosecutors attempted to apply the Alabama contributing 
statute to drive-in movie theater owners showing allegedly obscene films. The Alabama 
statute stated: "'It shall be unlawful for any parent, guardian, or other person to aid, 
encourage, or cause any child under eighteen years of age to become or remain dependent, 
neglected or delinquent...'" Id. at 808 (statutory citation omitted). The court permanently 
enjoined prosecution of the theater owners under the statute: 
serve the governed, not the governors. The Government's power to censor the press was 
abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The press 
was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people." New 
York Times v. United States. 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring). 
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Phrases such as 'to cause any child to become delinquent,' ;to 
induce, aid or encourage any child,' . . . cannot meet the strict 
standard of specificity required in a criminal statute affecting 
expression protected by the first amendment. 
Id. at 819. 
The relevant language of § 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii) is virtually identical to the language 
of the Alabama statute and, thus, subject to the same constitutional infirmities. Section 78-
3a-801(l)(a)(ii), which makes it illegal for a person 18 or older to do any act which "tends 
to cause minors to become or remain delinquent," is simply too vague to apprise news 
reporters that they may be subject to criminal sanctions if they interview and film juveniles 
engaged in illegal behavior. Such a vague statute is subject to abuse by law enforcement and 
other officials who may use it against journalists who, like Sawyers and Krueger, report on 
issues that public officials may deem embarrassing. See New York Times Co. v. United 
States. 403 U.S. 713, 723-24 (1971) ("The dominant purpose of the First Amendment was 
to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing 
information.") (Black and Douglas, J.J., concurring).12 
News gathering, as well as news reporting, is protected by the First Amendment and 
Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution. "[WJithout some protection for seeking out 
the news, freedom of the press would be eviscerated." Branzburg v. Hayes. 408 U.S. 665, 
12
 Unfortunately, it appears that these prosecutions are the result of pressure from 
Carbon High School officials who believed — erroneously — that the Channel 4 story cast the 
school in an embarrassing light. 
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681 (1972). Prosecution under a statute so clearly inapplicable to journalists in the process 
of gathering information to report the news cannot be permitted. Such a prosecution has an 
unconstitutionally chilling effect on all journalists, and the public's right to know will suffer. 
"The chilling effect upon exercise of First Amendment rights may derive from the fact of the 
prosecution unaffected by the prospects of its success or failure." Dombrowski v. Pfister. 
380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).13 
B. Even if the Utah Statute Were Not Unconstitutionally 
Vague, It Still Violates Free Speech and Press Guarantees of 
the United States and Utah Constitutions as Applied to the 
Journalists in This Case 
Even if § 78-3a-801(1 )(a)(ii) were not unconstitutionally vague — which it is — 
prosecuting journalists engaged in news gathering activities under these circumstances is 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment and Article I, Section 15 of the Utah 
Constitution. These reporters did not supply the tobacco. The students already possessed it 
and were regular users. Thus, the reporters did nothing to induce or encourage use of 
tobacco by any student who was not already a user. For effective news coverage of an 
important public health story, the reporters videotaped for their public audience the issue they 
were covering — the use by minors of chewing tobacco they already possessed and were 
predisposed to use. The State constitutionally cannot punish this conduct. See, e ^ , Smith 
13
 The Supreme Court has warned that "[t]he severity of criminal sanctions may well 
cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, 
ideas, and images." Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union. 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2345 (1997). 
20 
v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.. 443 U.S. 97, 105 (1979); People v. Denver Pub. Co.. Inc.. 597 
P.2d 1038, 1040 (Colo. 1979) (statute imposing criminal sanctions for publishing photo of 
participants in juvenile proceeding violates free speech and due process protections of state 
and federal constitutions). 
CONCLUSION 
Constitutional free speech and free press guarantees protect reporters gathering and 
reporting the news. They do so, not because reporters are a privileged class, but rather 
because reporters perform a service, indispensable to our democratic form of government, 
for all of us. As citizens, we need to know about crime and public health issues. As citizens 
and parents, we need to know when our children are engaging in hazardous and unlawful 
conduct; what government officials are doing about it; and the efficacy of their efforts. 
The prosecutions at issue here are improperly motivated, legally unsound and 
constitutionally prohibited. The Informations must be dismissed. 
DATED this 2^. day of May, 1998. 
WATKISS DUNNING & WATKISS, P.C. 
jregdry G. SWcras 
Brett JvDelPorftr 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes 




AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS] 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVI 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
[Quartering soldiers,] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the 
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by 
law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
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AMENDMENTS Amend. XIV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
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Art. I, § 15 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
P.2d 1302 (Utah), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894, 
104 S. Ct. 241, 78 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1983). 
Cited in State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1301 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitu-
tional Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 82. 
Note, State v. Nielsen: Immaterial False 
Statements in Search Warrant Affidavits, 1987 
Utah L. Rev. 753. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Legis-
lative Enactments — Labor Law, 1988 Utah L. 
Rev. 284. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Criminal Procedure, 1989 
Utah L. Rev. 223. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — An Ana-
lytical Model to Assure Consideration of Pa-
rental and Familial Interests When Defining 
the Constitutional Rights of Minors — An Ex-
amination of In re Scott K, 1980 B.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 598. 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note 
discussing "open fields" doctrine, 11 J. 
Contemp. L. 531 (1985). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 68 Am. Jur. 2d Searches 
and Seizures § 6 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 79 CJ.S. Searches and Seizures 
§ 3 et seq. 
AJL.R. — Admissibility, in civil case, of evi-
dence obtained by unlawful search and seizure, 
5 AXiUd 670. 
Lawfulness of seizure of property used in vio-
lation of law as prerequisite to forfeiture action 
or proceeding, 8 A.L.R.3d 473. 
Validity of consent to search given one in 
custody of officers, 9 A.L.R.3d 858. 
Traffic violation: lawfulness of search of mo-
tor vehicle following arrest for traffic violation, 
10 AX.R.3d 314. 
Propriety of considering hearsay or other in-
competent evidence in establishing probable 
cause for issuance of search warrant, 10 
A.L.R.3d 359. 
Criminal liability for obstructing process as 
affected by invalidity or irregularity of the pro-
cess, 10 A.L.R.3d 1146. 
Sufficiency of description, in search warrant, 
of apartment or room to be searched in multi-
ple-occupancy structure, 11 A.L.R.3d 1330. 
Modern status of rule as to validity of 
nonconsentual search and seizure made with-
out warrant after lawful arrest as affected by 
lapse of time between, or difference in places 
of, arrest and search, 19 A.L.R.3d 727. 
Plea of guilty as waiver of claim of unlawful 
search and seizure, 20 A.L.R.3d 724. 
Propriety of execution of search warrant at 
nighttime, 26 A.L.R.3d 951. 
Propriety of governmental eavesdropping on 
communications between accused and his at-
torney, 44 A.L.R.4th 841. 
Validity of arrest made in reliance upon un-
corrected or outdated warrant list or similar 
police records, 45 A.L.R.4th 550. 
Officer's ruse to gain entry as affecting ad-
missibility of plain-view evidence—modern 
cases, 47 A.L.R.4th 425. 
Search and seizure: necessity that police ob-
tain warrant before taking possession of, ex-
amining, or testing evidence discovered in 
search by private person, 47 A.L.R.4th 501. 
Eavesdropping on extension telephone as in-
vasion of privacy, 49 A.L.R.4th 430. 
Propriety of state or local government health 
officer's warrantless search — post-Camara 
cases, 53 A.L.R.4th 1168. 
Seizure of books, documents, or other papers 
under search warrant not describing such 
items, 54 A.LR.4th 391. 
Search and seizure of telephone company 
records pertaining to subscriber as violation of 
subscriber's constitutional rights, 76 A.L.R.4th 
536. 
Necessity that Miranda warnings include ex-
press reference to right to have attorney 
present during interrogation, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 
123. 
Fourth Amendment as prohibiting strip 
searches of arrestees or pretrial detainees, 78 
A.L.R. Fed. 201. 
Key Numbers. — Searches and Seizures *=> 
2, 7(1). 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the 
press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence 
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as 
libelous is true, and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the 
law and the fact. 
112 
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 76-2-101 
Section 
76-2-305. Mental illness — Use as a de-
fense — Influence of alcohol 
or other substance voluntar-
ily consumed — Definition. 
76-2-306. Voluntary intoxication. 
76-2-307. Voluntary termination of efforts 
prior to offense. 
76-2-308. Affirmative defenses. 
Part 4 
Justification Excluding Criminal 
Responsibility 
76-2-401. Justification as defense — 
When allowed. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-101, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-101; 1983, ch. 90, § 1; 





The bending down of a stop sign at an inter-
section so that it was not visible to traffic was 
sufficient to constitute criminal negligence. 
State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980). 
Mental state. 
Public officer was not punishable for an act 
committed innocently without criminal intent, 
where statute, with no reference to mental 
Section 
76-2-402. Force in defense of person — 
Forcible felony defined. 
76-2-403. Force in arrest. 
76-2-404. Peace officer's use of deadly 
force. 
76-2-405. Force in defense of habitation. 
76-2-406. Force in defense of property. 
state, made private appropriation of public 
money a felony. State v. Blue, 17 Utah 175,53 P. 
978 (1898). 
In prosecution for grand larceny of steer, trial 
court's refusal to permit defendant to testify as 
to his intent and belief in possessing and claim-
ing animal was erroneous. State v. Sawyer, 54 
Utah 275, 182 P. 206 (1919). 
Intent was an essential element of first de-
gree murder, it was reversible error to refuse to 
allow defendant to testify in regard thereto. 
State v. Stenback, 78 Utah 350, 2 P.2d 1050, 79 
A.L.R. 878 (1931). 
PARTI 
CULPABILITY GENERALLY 
76-2-101. Requirements of criminal conduct and criminal 
responsibility. 
No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct is prohibited by law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negli-
gence, or with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining 
the offense, as the definition of the offense requires; or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving strict liability. 
These standards of criminal responsibility shall not apply to the violations 
set forth in Title 41, Chapter 6, unless specifically provided by law. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 76-2-103 
76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge"; 
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negli-
gence or criminally negligent." 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of 
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective 
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of 
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that 
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surround-
ing his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when 
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise 
in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C 1953, 76-2-103, enacted by L. 










The bending down of a stop sign at an inter-
section so that it was not visible to traffic was 
sufficient to constitute criminal negligence. 
State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980). 
The sole difference between reckless man-
slaughter and negligent homicide is whether 
the defendant actually knew of the risk of death 
or was not, but should have been, aware of it. In 
both cases, a defendant's conduct must be a 
"gross deviation" from the standard of care 
exercised by an ordinary person. Thus, ordi-
nary negligence, which is the basis for a civil 
action for damages, is not sufficient to consti-
tute criminal negligence. State v. Standiford, 
769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988). 
—Expert testimony. 
While expert testimony is not required to 
prove the mental state of a criminal defendant 
accused of homicide, expert testimony is re-
quired where criminal negligence is alleged and 
the nature and degree of risk are beyond the 
ken of the average layperson. State v. Warden, 
784 P.2d 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), reVd on 
other grounds, 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991). 
Trial court committed no abuse of discretion 
in allowing physicians to testify at defendant 
physician's trial for negligent homicide involv-
ing the death of an infant after a premature 
home delivery. State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 1204 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), revM on other grounds, 
813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991). 
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OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY 76-10-105.1 
History: C. 1953,76-10-104, enacted by L. as enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-104, 
1974, ch. 32, § 39; 1989, ch. 194, § 1. relating to use of cigars, cigarettes or tobacco in 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws enclosed public place, and enacted present 
1974.cn. 32, § 39 repealed former § 76-10-104, § 76-10-104. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d Infants § 16. minors, 55 A.L.R.4th 1238. 
C.J.S. — 43 C.J.S. Infants §§ 92, 95. Key Numbers. — Infants «=> 13. 
AJLJL — Civil liability for tobacco sales to 
76-10-105. Buying or possessing cigars, cigarettes, or to-
bacco by minors — Penalty — Compliance officer 
authority — Juvenile court jurisdiction. 
(1) Any person under the age of 19 years who buys, accepts, or has in his 
possession any cigar, cigarette, or tobacco in any form is guilty of a class C 
misdemeanor, or may be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
(2) A compliance officer appointed by a board of education under Section 
53A-3-402 may issue citations for violations of this section committed on school 
property. Cited violations shall be reported to the appropriate juvenile court. 
History: C. 1953,76-10-105, enacted by L. relating to abuse of psychotoxic chemical sol-
1974, ch. 32, § 40; 1986, ch. 26, § 19; 1988, vents, and enacted present § 76-10-105. For 
ch. 2, § 341; 1989, ch. 194, § 2. present provisions regarding psychotoxic 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws chemical solvents, see § 76-10-107. 
1974, ch. 32, § 40 repealed former § 76-10-105 Cross-References. — Juvenile court juris-
(enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-104), diction, § 78-3a-16. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d Infants § 15. Key Numbers. — Infants «=» 68. 
C.J.S. — 43 C.J.S. Infants § 196. 
76-10-105.1. Prohibition of gift or sale of cigarettes or 
tobacco through vending machines — Excep-
tions — Penalties. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), the gift or sale of cigarettes or 
tobacco in any form through vending machines or tobacco product machines is 
prohibited in this state. 
(2) (a) A bar, or a privately owned and operated club or association that has 
a private club liquor license under Title 32A, Chapter 5, or that requires 
membership and charges a membership fee, may maintain cigarette or 
tobacco product vending machines on its premises. 
(b) A workplace may maintain cigarette or tobacco product vending 
machines for its adult employees, in an area not available to the general 
public. 
(3) Violation of this section is a class C misdemeanor on the first offense, a 
class B misdemeanor on the second offense, and a class A misdemeanor on 
subsequent offenses. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-105.1, enacted by 
L. 1989, ch. 194, § 3. 
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78-3a-801 JUDICIAL CODE 
PART 8 
ADULT OFFENSES 
78-3a-801. Jurisdiction of adults for offenses against mi-
nors — Proof of delinquency not required for 
conviction. 
(1) The court shall have concurrent jurisdiction to try the following adults 
for offenses committed against minors: 
(a) any person 18 years of age or older who: 
(i) solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids 
or who acts with a minor in the violation of any federal, state, or local 
law or municipal ordinance; 
(ii) tends to cause minors to become or remain delinquent; or 
(iii) aids, contributes to, or becomes responsible for the neglect, 
abuse, or delinquency of any minor; 
(b) any person 18 years or older, having a minor in his legal custody, or 
under his care, or in his employment, who willfully abuses or ill-treats, 
neglects, or abandons the minor in any manner likely to cause the minor 
unnecessary suffering or serious injury to his health or morals; 
(c) any person 18 years or older who: 
(i) forcibly takes away a minor from, or wrongfully encourages him 
to leave, the legal or physical custody of any person, agency, or 
institution in which the minor lawfully resides or has been legally 
placed for the purpose of care, support, education, or adoption; or 
(ii) knowingly detains or harbors a minor whom he has reasonable 
grounds to believe has escaped or fled from the custody of any agency 
or institution in which the minor lawfully resides or has run away 
from his parent, guardian, or custodian; 
(d) any person 18 years of age or older who: 
(i) provides a minor with an alcoholic beverage or a controlled 
substance; or 
(ii) encourages or permits a minor to consume an alcoholic bever-
age or controlled substance; or 
(e) any person 18 years of age or older who fails to report child abuse, as 
required by Title 62A, Chapter 4a, Part 4, Child Abuse or Neglect 
Reporting Requirements. 
(2) It is not necessary in order to obtain a conviction under this statute to 
establish that the minor had become a delinquent or committed a delinquent 
act. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3a-801, enacted by L. Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 1, § 94 
1996, ch. 1, § 72. makes the act effective on January 31, 1996. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Contributing to delinquency of minor. 
Contributing to delinquency of minor. — Evidence sufficient. 
— Evidence sufficient. Where defendant, an osteopathic physician, 
— Proof beyond reasonable doubt. gave prescriptions for excessive quantities of 
Sheltering runaway child. amphetamines and barbiturates to a seven-
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Rulings on Motions to Dismiss 
Hon. Bryce K. Bryner, Seventh Judicial District 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT! 
FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, RULING ON MOTION TO 
Plaintiff, DISMISS 
vs« I 
JOSEPH K. KRUEGER, 
Defendant Case No.: 971700509 
On September 12, 1997, the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss together with a Memorandum 
in Support. Oral argument on the motion was heard on November 3, 1997, and the court took the 
matter under advisement and now issues this ruling. 
The Information charges the defendant with five counts of Contributing to the Delinquency of 
a Minor, each a Class B Misdemeanor. However, Count IV was later dismissed because the student 
named therein was eighteen years old at the time and therefore not a minor. The offenses allegedly 
took place on February 18, 1997, on the campus of Carbon High School during a KTVX news 
interview with a number of students as a result of which the five students were issued tobacco 
citations. Defendant asserts that the Information should be dismissed because (1) the defendant did 
nothing to contribute to unlawful conduct by the students, and (2) penalizing journalists for exercising 
First Amendment rights is patently unconstitutional. 
I. Does the Defendant's Conduct Violate Sec. 78-3a-801? 
At the outset, the court notes that the four minor students and one 18 year old adult student 
identified in the Information, all of whom were students at Carbon High, were issued tobacco 
citations alleging violation of Section 76-10-105 Utah Code Annotated. A review of that section 
reveals that the essence of that offense lies in the buying, accepting, or possessing of tobacco by 
anyone under the age of 19. It is significant to note that the statute does not specify "use" of tobacco 
as an element of the offense. The gist of the offense lies in the "possessing" of the substance. 
A. Subparagraph (I) 
The State has not disputed the allegation contained in paragraph nine of defendants' 
memorandum to the effect that the tobacco possessed by the minors was not furnished by the 
defendant and there has been no allegation made that the defendant furnished or provided the minors 
with the chewing tobacco. It is also affirmatively alleged numerous times in defendants' 
memorandum and at oral argument that the students already had the tobacco in their possession at 
the time they were approached by the defendant for the interview, which allegations were not 
disputed by the State. 
In reviewing the section under which the defendant is charged, 78-3a-801(l)(a) Utah Code 
Annotated, the court finds that the defendant did not commit the offense stated in subsection (I) for 
the reason that the offense of possession of tobacco had already been committed by the students and 
FILED 
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was in the process of being committed when the students were approached by the defendant. 
B. Subparagraph (ii) 
There is a dispute as to whether the defendant told the five students to chew tobacco on camera. 
Paragraph 11 in the brief states that defendant did not tell the students to chew and that defendant 
said she told the students to "simply do what they would ordinarily do," whereas paragraph nine of 
the brief states that some of the students allege that defendant and the co-defendant asked them to 
chew tobacco on camera. At this stage of the proceedings it is impermissible for the court to 
determine which of the two versions, if either, is correct, and that decision is left to the fact-finder. 
Because the fact-finder could find that the defendant asked the students to chew tobacco on 
camera that was already in the students' possession, the fact-finder could also find that the defendant 
prolonged the time during which the students were committing an ongoing offense, and that by 
prolonging the period of unlawful possession of tobacco the defendant tended to cause "minors to 
remain delinquent" in violation of 78-3a-801(1 )(ii). 
Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the defendant did not violate 
Section 78-3a-801 is denied. 
II. Is the Utah Statute Unconstitutionally Vague as Applied? 
Defendant asserts that Section 78-3a-801(l)(a), as applied in this case, violates the defendant's 
First Amendment rights because it is unconstitutionally vague, and specifically argues that the 
language "tends to cause minors to become or remain delinquent" is too vague to apprise reporters 
that they may be subject to criminal sanctions if they interview juveniles engaged in illegal behavior. 
The court finds that the wording of the statue in question is sufficiently specific to apprise 
reporters of proscribed conduct. The court is mindful that reporters have a constitutionally protected 
right to report illegal activity, but the issue this case presents is whether the defendant as a reporter 
exceeded the scope of that right by allegedly going one step further and engaging in conduct that 
tended to cause minors to engage in the illegal activity being reported or to continue in the illegality. 
Although the defendant urges the court to find that the statue is vague and cites the ruling of an 
Alabama decision involving nearly identical language, the court finds that wording of the statute in 
question is sufficiently specific to apprise reporters of proscribed conduct. The motion to dismiss on 
constitutional grounds is therefore denied. 
DATED this 2nd day of January, 1998. 
BRYCE K. &RYNER 
District Court Judge 
^LLUL ;\lunr<rzr 
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foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Gregory G. Skordas 
Elizabeth T. Dunning 
Brett J. DelPorto 
Attorneys at Law 
Broadway Centre, Suite 800 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2304 
Gene Strate 
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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARY ANN SAWYERS, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
<%
 5 . 
Case No.: 971700508 
On September 12, 1997, the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss together with a Memorandum 
in Support. Oral argument on the motion was heard on November 3, 1997, and the court took the 
matter under advisement and now issues this ruling. 
The Information charges the defendant with five counts of Contributing to the Delinquency of 
a Minor, each a Class B Misdemeanor. However, Count IV was later dismissed because the student 
named therein was eighteen years old at the time and therefore not a minor. The offenses allegedly 
took place on February 18, 1997, on the campus of Carbon High School during a KTVX news 
interview with a number of students as a result of which the five students were issued tobacco 
citations. Defendant asserts that the Information should be dismissed because (1) the defendant did 
nothing to contribute to unlawful conduct by the students, and (2) penalizing journalists for exercising 
First Amendment rights is patently unconstitutional. 
I. Does the Defendant's Conduct Violate Sec. 78-3a-801? 
At the outset, the court notes that the four minor students and one 18 year old adult student 
identified in the Information , all of whom were students at Carbon High, were issued tobacco 
citations alleging violation of Section 76-10-105 Utah Code Annotated. A review of that section 
reveals that the essence of that offense lies in the buying, accepting, or possessing of tobacco by 
anyone under the age of 19. It is significant to note that the statute does not specify "use" of tobacco 
as an element of the offense. The aist of the offense lies in the "possessing" of the substance. 
A. Subparagraph (I) 
The State has not disputed the allegation contained in paragraph nine of defendants' 
memorandum to the effect that the tobacco possessed by the minors was not furnished by the 
defendant and there has been no allegation made that the defendant furnished or provided the minors 
with the chewing tobacco. It is also affirmatively alleged numerous times in defendants' 
memorandum and at oral argument that the students already had the tobacco in their possession at 
the time they were approached by the defendant for the interview, which allegations were not 
disputed by the State. 
In reviewing the section under which the defendant is charged, 73-3a-801(l)(a) Utah Code 
Annotated, the court finds that the defendant did not commit the offense stated in subsection (I) for 
the reason that the offense of possession of tobacco had already been committed by the students and 
1 
was in the process of being committed when the students were approached by the defendant. 
B. Subparagraph (ii) 
There is a dispute as to whether the defendant told the five students to chew tobacco on camera. 
Paragraph 11 in the brief states that defendant did not tell the students to chew and that defendant 
said she told the students to "simply do what they would ordinarily do," whereas paragraph nine of 
the brief states that some of the students allege that defendant and the co-defendant asked them to 
chew tobacco on camera. At this stage of the proceedings it is impermissible for the court to 
determine which of the two versions, if either, is correct, and that decision is left to the fact-finder. 
Because the fact-finder could find that the defendant asked the students to chew tobacco on 
camera that was already in the students' possession, the fact-finder could also find that the defendant 
prolonged the time during which the students were committing an ongoing offense, and that by 
prolonging the period of unlawful possession of tobacco the defendant tended to cause "minors to 
remain delinquent" in violation of 78-3a-801(1 )(ii). 
Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the defendant did not violate 
Section 78-3a-801 is denied. 
n. Is the Utah Statute Unconstitutionally Vague as Applied? 
Defendant asserts that Section 78-3a-801(l)(a), as applied in this case, violates the defendant's 
First Amendment rights because it is unconstitutionally vague, and specifically argues that the 
language "tends to cause minors to become or remain delinquent" is too vague to apprise reporters 
that they may be subject to criminal sanctions if they interview juveniles engaged in illegal behavior. 
The court finds that the wording of the statue in question is sufficiently specific to apprise 
reporters of proscribed conduct. The court is mindful that reporters have a constitutionally protected 
right to report illegal activity, but the issue this case presents is whether the defendant as a reporter 
exceeded the scope of that right by allegedly going one step further and engaging in conduct that 
tended to cause minors to engage in the illegal activity being reported or to continue in the illegality. 
Although the defendant urges the court to find that the statue is vague and cites the ruling of an 
Alabama decision involving nearly identical language, the court finds that wording of the statute in 
question is sufficiently specific to apprise reporters of proscribed conduct. The motion to dismiss on 
constitutional grounds is therefore denied. 
DATED this 2nd day of January, 1998. 
^ S7 
BRYCE K. B ^ N E R 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MATT INK 
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of January, 1998, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Gregory G. Skordas 
Elizabeth T. Dunning 
Brett J. DelPorto 
Attorneys at Law 
Broadway Centre, Suite 800 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2304 
Gene Strate 
Carbon County Attorney 
120 East Main 
Price, Utah 84501 
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3RD CASE of Level 1 printed in FULL format. 
In re: UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Debtor 
Civil No. 89-0561 (CRR) 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
106 Bankr. 323; 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13927; 16 Media L. Rep. 2401 
September 1, 1989, Decided 
September 1, 1989, Filed 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: As Amended September 22, 
1989. 
COUNSEL: [**1] Plaintiff: Robert Merce, Schutter 
& Glickstein, Honolulu, Hawaii; Duane D Morse, 
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering. 
Defendant: Paul Alston, Robyn B. Chun, Mei 
Nakamoto, Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt, Honolulu, 
Hawaii; Bruce W. Sanford, Leonard H. Freiman, Baker 
& Hostetler, Washington, District of Columbia. 
JUDGES: Charles R. Richey, United States District 
Judge. 
OPINIONBY: RICHEY 
OPINION: [*323] OPINION OF CHARLES R. 
RICHEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
CHARLES R. RICHEY, UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
United Press International ("UPI"), the debtor in this 
action, has moved for summary judgment on Larry 
Mehau's claim for [*324] damages. The dispute arises 
out of allegedly defamatory statements that a UPI re-
porter sent over the UPI wire in 1977. Mehau, then 
a member of Hawaii's Board of Land and Natural 
Resources, claims that the statements soiled his name 
by linking him to underworld activity in Hawaii. For 
the reasons stated herein, UPI's motion for summary 
judgment shall be granted. 
A. Factual Background 
On June 15, 1977, The Valley Isle, a bi-weekly, 
Honolulu-based newspaper (now defunct), published a 
story on the recent death of George Helm, a Hawaiian 
environmental activist. The Valley Isle story strongly 
implied that Helm and another man had been killed by 
local underworld [**2] figures. The story included an 
interview with Adolph Helm, George's brother; Adolph 
claimed in the interview that George had told him and 
others before his death that he had unearthed strong 
evidence of underworld influence in Hawaii politics. 
Adolph further stated that George had told a group of 
approximately 100 people that Larry Mehau was the 
"Godfather" of organized crime in Hawaii. Adolph also 
recounted an incident at a local restaurant in which, ac-
cording to George, Mehau had personally threatened to 
"break George's ass" unless George ceased his efforts to 
uncover local corruption. George Helm disappeared off 
the coast of a Hawaiian island on March 7, 1977. 
Dennis Stone, a UPI reporter, became aware of the 
Valley Isle story on the date of its publication. The 
record indicates that the question of mob influence in 
Hawaii politics had generated some media interest in the 
preceding months. Stone had been aware of this interest, 
and upon learning of the Valley Isle story, he regarded it 
as an opportunity to "scoop" the competition, nl Stone 
immediately called the Maui News newspaper, where an 
unidentified employee read to him portions of the Valley 
Isle story. Stone [**3] then called the Press Secretary of 
the Governor of Hawaii and asked for comment on the 
Valley Isle story. The Press Secretary had no informa-
tion on the story or its contents. After unsuccessfully 
attempting to reach Adolph Helm, Stone spoke with the 
Helms' father, George Sr., who confirmed that George 
had discussed threats from Larry Mehau. Based upon 
these discussions, Stone sent the following story over 
the national wire: 
Adolph Helm . . . . brother of the missing Hawaiian 
activist George Helm . . . . was quoted today in the 
biweekly Valley Isle Press as naming State Land Board 
Big Island member Larry Mehau as the "Godfather" of 
106 Bankr. 323, *324; 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13927, **3; 
16 Media L. Rep. 2401 
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Hawaii's underworld crime. Adolph Helm also was 
quoted as reveling [sic] that his brother, now feared 
dead, said Mehau threatened him when Helm was a mu-
sician at Honolulu's Gold Coin restaurant. The Helm 
brothers' father confirmed that George Helm said he 
was repeatedly threatened. Before he apparently died, 
George Helm told his brother he had a lot to reveal 
about Hawaii's organized crime. Adolph Helm also re-
portedly fingered Marcus Lipske, believed the manager 
of singer Don Ho, as the local underworld's link with 
the mainland syndicate. n2 
nl Stone Dep. at 52. 
r**4] 
n2 Exh. 8 to UPI Mem. (ellipses in original). 
After distributing this first story, Stone was able to 
make contact with Adolph Helm. Adolph confirmed 
to Stone that the substance of the Valley Isle story accu-
rately reflected what he had told the Valley Isle reporters. 
n3 Stone was also able to obtain a copy of the Valley Isle 
and read the story for himself. He thereafter sent the fol-
lowing over the UPI wire, approximately an hour after 
the first story: 
Adolph Helm, the brother of the missing and feared 
dead 
[*325] Hawaiian activist George Helm, revealed to-
day that George Helm told many of his follwers [sic] 
that State Board of Land and Natural Resources mem-
ber Larry Mehau of the Big Island is the Godfather of 
Hawaii's underworld. Helm, interviewed at his Molokai 
residence, said his brother told 40 to 50 people prior to 
a March "invasion" of Kahoolawe that Mehua [sic] and 
other people ~ quote — "higher up" were deeply involved 
in organized crime. Helm quoted his brother as saying 
he was planning to expose them and "all the corruption 
that was happening." Helm's apparent death this past 
March is believed being investigated by Maui County 
and the FBI. n4 
n3 Mehau submitted an affidavit in which he stated 
that Adolph Helm later met with him and complained 
that the Valley Isle had misquoted and distorted his 
comments. However, Adolph's deposition, taken af-
ter the meeting with Mehau, shows that Adolph was 
comfortable with the Valley Isle story, and believed 
that it fairly reflected his views. Helm Dep. at 24-
29. In any event, as will be shown, this dispute is 
not material to the legal issues underlying the Court's 
ruling. 
[**5] 
n4 Exh. 7 to UPI Mem. 
The next day, on June 16, UPI distributed a story de-
tailing Governor George Ariyoshi's strong defense of 
Mehau and his categorical rejection of the Valley Isle 
story. 
The record indicates that Stone was a relatively in-
experienced reporter, and that he distributed the Mehau 
story on his last day with UPI. It appears that he knew 
next to nothing of the Valley Isle at the time he dis-
tributed his stories. n5 The record further indicates that 
while the Valley Isle story and Stone's releases gained 
the attention of some members of the local media, others 
deemed the information unreliable and refused to report 
the Valley Isle story. n6 
n5 At his deposition, Stone indicated that when he 
distributed the stories, "the entirety" of his knowl-
edge of the Valley Isle was "that they had run this 
story and that it was a bi-weekly newspaper on the 
island of Maui." Stone Dep. at 49. 
n6 For instance, Robert Sevey, a reporter with 
KGMB-TV in Honolulu, refused to report the Valley 
Isle story because of his doubts as to the newspaper's 
reliability. See Sevey Dep. at 10-11. 
Mehau brought this defamation action in Hawaii state 
court against UPI [**6] and several other defendants 
on June 23, 1977. After approximately two years of 
discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment in 
UPI's favor. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of 
Hawaii reversed, finding that the record contained suf-
ficient facts from which a reasonable jury might find, 
under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
270-71, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964), that 
Stone acted with actual malice when he sent the two 
stories over the UPI wire. Mehau v. Gannett Pacific 
Corp., 66Haw. 133, 658P.2d312 (1983). The Hawaii 
Supreme Court's opinion dealt only with the actual mal-
ice standard as applied to the record before it. 
In April of 1985, after remand and additional dis-
covery, Mehau stipulated to the dismissal of his claims 
against all non-diverse defendants, leaving only UPI in 
the case. On May 16, 1985 UPI filed with the state court 
a Notice of Bankruptcy Petition and Automatic Stay. On 
May 17, 1985, UPI removed the suit to the United States 
106 Bankr. 323, *325; 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13927, **6; 
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District Court for the District of Hawaii. In April of 
1985, however, before the Hawaii district court could 
dispose of the case, UPI declared bankruptcy in the 
District of Columbia. UPI's bankruptcy stayed proceed-
ings in the [**7] Hawaii action, and forced Mehau to 
file a claim against UPI in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Columbia. UPI objected to the 
claim, and filed the instant motion for summary judg-
ment under Bankruptcy Rules 7056 and 9014. In turn, 
the Bankruptcy Court sua sponte requested a withdrawal 
of the reference of Mehau's claim because it raised the 
prospect of a jury trial. The matter came to this Court, 
and UPI's motion for summary judgment is now ripe for 
decision. 
B. ANALYSIS 
UPI offers two basic arguments in support of its mo-
tion for summary judgment. First, surveying the evi-
dence, UPI contends that the record lacks any rational 
basis for a finding (1) that Stone acted with actual malice 
under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan when he dis-
tributed the two stories, or (2) that Mehau has carried 
his burden of proving the falsity of Stone's statements 
by clear and convincing evidence. Second, UPI con-
tends that, regardless of Mehau's evidentiary showing, 
Stone's comments are absolutely privileged under the 
doctrine of neutral reportage, a theory first enunciated 
by the Second Circuit in Edwards v. National Audubon 
Society, 556F.2d 113 (2d Cir. [**8] 1977). Because the 
Court [*326] is in partial agreement with UPI as to its 
first argument, and in total agreement as to its second, 
the Court will grant UPI's motion. 
1. Insufficiency of the Evidence 
A. Actual Malice 
UPI first contends that no reasonable juror could find, 
from the facts presented in the record, that Stone trans-
mitted the two stories over the UPI wire with actual mal-
ice. Derived from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964), the 
actual malice standard requires (in this case) that Mehau 
show by clear and convincing evidence that Stone acted 
either "with knowledge that [the statements] were false," 
or "with reckless disregard of whether [they were] false 
or not." Id. at 279-80. If Mehau cannot make this 
showing, the "central meaning of the first amendment," 
id. at 273, compels dismissal of his claim. 
While this Court's independent review of the record 
might produce a different result, the Supreme Court of 
Hawaii has already applied the actual malice standard to 
the facts of this case. And that court has concluded that a 
reasonable juror might find Stone's actions to have been 
undertaken with reckless disregard for the statement's 
accuracy, [**9] and thus with actual malice under New 
York Times. Mehau v. Gannett Pacific Corp., 66 Haw. 
133, 147-48, 658 P.2d 312 (1983). n7 The Supreme 
Court's decision on this particular question is the law of 
the case. 
n7 The Supreme Court of Hawaii expressed its 
views as follows: 
UPI's treatment of the information gleaned from 
another source, the fact that the source was a new 
publication apparently given to sensationalizing the 
"news," and the anonymity of the authors of some 
of the crucial accusations published by the Valley 
Isle are a few of the factors we believe could lead 
to a finding by a jury that UPI's republication of 
the charges of criminality was not "made in good 
faith" or they were such that "only a reckless man 
would have put them in circulation." St. Amant v. 
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732, 88 S. Ct. 1323, 20 
L. Ed. 2d 262. 
Id. 
The Supreme Court's decision concededly rests upon a 
determination of federal law (i.e., a federal defense to a 
state law claim). This factor generally militates against 
a finding that a state court determination should con-
trol after the matter has been removed to federal court. 
Nevertheless, a careful reading of the Supreme Court's 
decision shows that the Supreme [**10] Court carefully 
applied - indeed presaged by some three years - the cur-
rently controlling law in this area. Contrary to UPI's 
assertion, the United States Supreme Court's subsequent 
decisions in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986), and 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 91 L. Ed. 
2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986), do not somehow in-
validate the Supreme Court of Hawaii's decision on the 
actual malice issue. The Court agrees with UPI that 
Liberty Lobby and Celotex altered the law of summary 
judgment in various respects. Nevertheless, it appears to 
the Court (1) that the Supreme Court of Hawaii applied 
precisely the test set forth in Liberty Lobby, n8 and (2) 
that the rule of Celotex has no bearing upon this case. 
Thus, the Court declines to accept UPI's contention that 
recent developments in federal law - i.e., the Liberty 
Lobby and Celotex decisions - warrant disruption of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Mehau. [*327] The values 
expressed in the law of the case doctrine are more com-
pelling. While UPI might disagree with the Supreme 
Court's conclusion in Mehau, the fact that the proper 
standard appears to have been applied is sufficient rea-
106 Bankr. 323, *327; 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13927, **10; 
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son to leave undisturbed [**11] a thoroughly reasoned 
decision of the highest court of Hawaii. 
n8 Summarized, the rule of Liberty Lobby might 
be stated as follows: (1) on summary judgment, 
a court is to review the non-movant's evidentiary 
showing through the prism of the substantive stan-
dard that would control at a trial on the merits; and 
(2) in determining which factual disputes are "mate-
rial, " the court is to give credence only to those facts 
upon which a reasonable juror might base a finding 
for the non-movant (in other words, the summary 
judgment standard is essentially the same as the di-
rected verdict standard). With this in mind, con-
sider the Supreme Court's statement in Mehau that 
on summary judgment in a defamation action a court 
"examines the evidence, taking all permissible infer-
ences and resolving questions of credibility in plain-
tiff s favor to determine whether a reasonable jury 
acting reasonably could find actual malice with con-
vincing clarity." Mehau, 66 Haw. at 145, 658 P2d 
at 321 (quoting Nader v. Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 50 
(D.C. 1979) (emphasis in original). It appears to the 
Court that this standard is precisely that set forth in 
Liberty Lobby. 
ness under the actual malice standard. They do not 
represent a holding that Mehau had satisfied his bur-
den of proving falsity. 
[**13] 
nlO UPI asserts that Mehau must prove falsity un-
der Hepps by clear and convincing evidence. UPI 
Mem. at 16. In Robertson v. McCloskey, 666 E 
Supp. 241, 248 (D.D.C. 1987), Judge Joyce Hens 
Green of this Court did conclude, for persuasive rea-
sons, that the Hepps analysis commands clear and 
convincing evidence. Nevertheless, in at least two 
opinions after Robertson, the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia has stated that the prepon-
derance of the evidence standard applies with respect 
to the Hepps falsity determination. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc. v. Rees, 271 US. App. D.C. 297, 852 F.2d 
595, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (dictum); Liberty Lobby, 
Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 267 U.S. App. D.C. 
337, 838E2d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Bork, 
J.) ("at least a fair preponderance of the evidence"). 
This Court will thus assume that the preponderance 
of the evidence is applicable, although, given the 
Court's conclusion that Mehau has failed to make 
even this less stringent showing, the choice of stan-
dards is without great significance. 
B. Burden of [**12] Proving Falsity 
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, however, did not ad-
dress the second of UPI's "evidentiary" contentions -
that Mehau has failed to carry his burden of proving 
the falsity of Stone's statements. n9 UPI's argument is 
based upon Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 
475 U.S. 767, 89 L. Ed. 2d 783, 106 S. Ct. 1558 
(1986). In Hepps, the United States Supreme Court ef-
fectively interposed an additional "element" that a plain-
tiff must prove in order to surmount a New York Times 
defense: not only must a plaintiff show that challenged 
statements were made with actual malice, a plaintiff must 
show as well that the statements were false. UPI argues 
that the record lacks any proof that Stone's statements 
were false. The Court agrees; no reasonable juror could 
find by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the 
statements Stone sent over the national wire were false. 
nlO Summary judgment in UPI's favor is therefore com-
pelled. 
n9 The Supreme Court of Hawaii did indicate that 
it regarded Stone's stories as potentially misleading. 
66 Haw. at 146-47, 658 P.2d at 321-22. Yet, the 
Supreme Court's statements were dicta, and were 
made in connection with its discussion of reckless-
The Court is perfectly willing to draw from the record 
the conclusion that Mehau is not a mobster; that he is not 
the "Godfather" of the Hawaii underworld. A reason-
able [** 14] juror could do the same. The issue, however, 
is not whether Mehau was or was not affiliated with the 
underworld. The issue is whether Mehau has offered 
sufficient evidence that the two statements Stone sent 
over the UPI wire on June 15, 1977, were inaccurate. 
He has not. 
It is crucial to consider precisely what Stone's state-
ments said. The first, issued at 12:55 p.m., reported 
the fact that the Valley Isle had released a story in which 
Adolph Helm had revealed his brother George's view 
that Mehau was the "Godfather" of the Hawaii under-
world. The second story, issued at 1:50 p.m., after Stone 
had actually spoken with Adolph Helm, simply reported 
once again the fact that Adolph Helm had stated that his 
brother George had told others that Mehau was involved 
with organized crime in Hawaii. The stories involve the 
reporting of, first, the substance of the Valley Isle story, 
and, second, the substance of Adolph Helm's comments 
to the Valley Isle and to Stone himself. Both stories 
make abundantly clear that the Helm brothers - and not 
Stone - were leveling the charges against Mehau. In a 
sense, the stories are tantamount to the reporting of two 
physical events: (1) Adolph's [**15] statements to the 
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Valley Isle; and the Valley Isle's subsequent repeating of 
those statements in its edition of June 15, 1977. 
Mehau has offered nothing to indicate that those phys-
ical events did not occur. There is no dispute that the 
Valley Isle printed a story on June 15, 1977, in which 
Adolph Helm reported his brother's view that Mehau 
was a member of the Hawaii underworld. The Valley 
Isle did print such a story. To be sure, Mehau attacks 
the [*328] first sentence of Stone's first story, which 
begins: "Adolph Helm . . . . was quoted today . 
. . . as naming State Land Board Big Island mem-
ber Larry Mehau as the "Godfather" of Hawaii's under-
world crime." In a purely technical sense, this asser-
tion is incorrect. Adolph Helm did not himself "name" 
Mehau; rather, Adolph only repeated to the Valley Isle 
his brother's view that Mehau was connected to the un-
derworld. Yet, in the Court's view, this technical error 
does not rise to the level of "falsity" contemplated un-
der Hepps. Cf., Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 
290, 28 L. Ed. 2d 45, 91 S. Ct. 633 (1971) ("falsi-
fication" for purposes of actual malice standard). See 
also Tavoulareas v. Piro, 260 U.S. App. DC. 39, 
817 F.2d 762, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (minor [**16] 
inaccuracies cannot "in reason and in law" support li-
ability for defamation); Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 581A, comment f (1977) ("It is not necessary [for 
a defendant] to establish the literal truth of the precise 
statement made. Slight inaccuracies of expression are 
immaterial provided that the defamatory charge is true 
in substance."), n i l 
n i l The same conclusion applies as a matter of 
law to the fact that, while the Valley Isle story re-
counted only one incident in which Mehau allegedly 
threatened George Helm, Stone's first story claimed 
that Helm's father had said that George had been "re-
peatedly" threatened by Mehau. Even if erroneous, 
Stone's statement is not "false" as a matter of law 
under Hepps. 
As for Stone's second story, Mehau has offered no ev-
idence that Adolph Helm did not tell Stone, after Stone 
contacted Helm at his Molokai residence, that his brother 
George "had told many of his followers that [Mehau] . 
. . . is the Godfather of Hawaii's underworld," or that 
Helm did not tell Stone of the other matters contained 
in the second story. Quite the contrary, Adolph Helm's 
deposition testimony indicates that Helm confirmed to 
Stone that he had spoken [**17] with the Valley Isle, 
and that the Valley Isle had accurately reported his com-
ments. nl2 There is some question as to precisely what 
types of questions Stone asked Helm when they spoke, 
but this dispute in no way suggests that Adolph Helm 
did not "reveal" on June 15 the matters contained in the 
second story. nl3 
nl2 Helm Dep. at 40. 
nl3 Mehau relies upon a meeting following all 
of this between himself and Adolph Helm at which 
Helm is alleged to have retracted his statements to 
the Valley Isle and to have claimed that he was mis-
quoted by the Valley Isle. Mehau Aff. (February 
11, 1980). Although Helm's deposition contradicts 
Mehau's affidavit, the Court would decide no dif-
ferently even if Mehau's affidavit were absolutely 
correct. While it might be relevant to the accuracy 
of the Valley Isle story, nothing in Mehau's affidavit 
impugns in any way the accuracy of Stone's stories. 
In the Court's view, no reasonable juror could find that 
Mehau has proven by "a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence" that either of Stone's stories were "false" within 
the meaning of Hepps. Mehau has offered nothing to in-
dicate that the events and statements described in Stone's 
[**18] stories did not occur, or that Stone did not de-
pict those events and statements with substantial accu-
racy. Summary judgment must be granted in UPI's fa-
vor. See Liberty Lobby v. Dow Jones, Inc., 267 U.S. 
App. D.C. 337, 838 F.2d 1287, 1294-96 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (where no reasonable juror could find challenged 
statements false, summary judgment granted in defen-
dant's favor). 
2. Neutral Reportage 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, UPI also argues that 
Stone's stories are absolutely immune from defamation 
liability under the neutral reportage doctrine. The Court 
agrees. 
The neutral reportage doctrine finds its genesis in 
Edwards v. National Audubon Society, 556 F.2d 113 
(2d Cir.) cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1002, 98 S. Ct. 647, 
54 L. Ed. 2d 498 (1977). In Edwards, the Second 
Circuit held defamation liability "constitutionally im-
permissible" where the defendant, the New York Times, 
had merely reported charges levelled by the National 
Audubon Society against certain scientists. As "suc-
cinctly stated" by Judge Kaufman, "when a responsi-
ble, prominent organization like the National Audubon 
Society makes serious charges against a public figure, 
the First Amendment protects the accurate and disin-
terested reporting of those [**19] charges, [*329] re-
gardless of the reporter's private views regarding their 
validity." Id. at 120. 
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
has yet to speak regarding the neutral reportage doc-
trine, see White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 707 E 
Supp. 579, 596 (D.D.C. 1989), and those circuits that 
have considered the doctrine have left its contours rather 
ill-defined. For instance, in an en banc decision shortly 
after Edwards, the Second Circuit itself expressed some 
concerns with the doctrine's potential breadth. See 
Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co., 639 E2d 54, 69 (2d 
Cir. 1980) ("The need for the careful limitation of a con-
stitutional privilege for fair reportage is demonstrated 
by the breadth of that defense, which confers immunity 
even for publishing statements believed to be untrue."). 
And the Third Circuit has expressly declined to follow 
Edwards. Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583 E2d 1221, 1225-26 
(3d Cir. 1978). nl4 The Eighth Circuit, by contrast, ap-
pears to have adopted a relatively expansive conception 
of the doctrine, permitting its application even when the 
author makes clear his or her personal views on the re-
ported matter. Price v. Viking [**20] Penguin, Inc., 881 
E2d 1426, slip op. at 12 (8th Cir. 1989) (Heaney, S.J.). 
In this Court's view, the logic of the doctrine, coupled 
with the weight of federal precedent, favor adoption of 
a neutral reportage doctrine in this circuit. However, 
as the ambiguity surrounding the content of the doctrine 
indicates, what the Court adopts is less than perfectly 
clear. 
nl4 But see Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 E2d 
134, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1981) (while not repudiat-
ing Dickey, noting that Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
might be inclined to adopt neutral reportage doctrine 
in light of the "trend of federal case law" supporting 
such a privilege). 
Among the undefined aspects of the privilege is the 
weight to be given each of the factors Mehau relies 
upon in opposing UPI's motion for summary judgment. 
Mehau's argument rests upon the specific facts and lan-
guage of Edwards itself. In Edwards, Judge Kaufman's 
language arguably limited the doctrine's use to cases in 
which the initial "defamer" is a "responsible, promi-
nent organization like the National Audubon Society." 
556 E2d at 120. Mehau contends that because the ini-
tial "defamers" were the Valley Isle and Adolph Helm, 
[**21] and because neither of them were "responsible" 
or "prominent" in the sense that the National Audubon 
Society was in Edwards, UPI cannot rely upon the doc-
trine in this case. 
Judge Kaufman may well have intended to limit the 
doctrine through his choice of language in Edwards. See 
also Cianci, 639 E2d at 68. Nevertheless, this Court is 
of the view that such a limitation to the reiteration only of 
statements of "responsible" or "prominent" "defamers" 
is inconsistent with the raison d'etre of the doctrine. It 
is essential that the press be at liberty to report serious 
charges against public officials without excessive con-
cern for the source. Were the press secure only in report-
ing the charges of "responsible" or "prominent" persons 
or entities - with these terms undoubtedly defined in 
light of the values of some established class - the "ro-
bust and unintimidated press" for which Judge Kaufman 
showed such concern would undoubtedly suffer. nl5 
nl5 See Edwards, 556 E2d at 120 ("if we are 
to enjoy the blessings of a robust and unintimidated 
press, we must provide immunity from defamation 
suits where the journalist believes, reasonably and 
in good faith, that his report accurately conveys the 
charges made."). 
[**22] This Court is more comfortable with the views 
expressed in Judge Patel's carefully reasoned opinion in 
Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1122-28 (N.D. 
Cal. 1984). In Barry, Judge Patel rejected an argument 
identical to Mehau's, and held that "a more sensible ap-
proach is to extend the neutral reportage privilege to all 
republications of serious charges by one participant in an 
existing public controversy against another participant in 
that controversy, regardless of the 'trustworthiness' of 
the original defamer." Id. at 1126. Judge Patel prop-
erly noted that "it is the neutrality of the report which 
is critical." Id. at 1127. If neutrality is maintained, the 
public - as opposed to the reporter or a judge — [*330] 
can serve as the final arbiter of the trustworthiness of the 
defamer and his statements. Id. The First Amendment, 
it seems to the Court, demands no less. Accordingly, 
having interpreted the neutral reportage doctrine in this 
fashion, the Court finds that the status of the Valley Isle 
and Adolph Helm as "unresponsible" or "unprominent" 
nl6 does not negate application of the neutral reportage 
doctrine in this case. 
nl6 The Court recognizes that Barry dealt only 
with the question of whether a defamer need be 
"responsible," and did not address whether he or 
she need be "prominent." In that case, the court 
expressly found that the original defamer (basket-
ball player Quentin Dailey) was "prominent." In the 
Court's view, however, there should be no require-
ment that an original defamer be either "responsible" 
or "prominent." A prominence requirement is es-
sentially an additional safeguard of trustworthiness, 
and, as noted above, trustworthiness of the defamer 
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is not (or should not be) a prerequisite to the neutral 
reportage defense. 
[**23] The second basis upon which Mehau would 
avoid UPI's neutral reportage defense in this case is 
through reliance upon the fact that, in Edwards, the re-
porter "in good faith elicited both sides of the story to 
the best of his ability." Id. at 118. Mehau contends that, 
unlike the reporter in Edwards, Stone simply reiterated 
the Valley Isle's charges without undertaking an inde-
pendent investigation of their possible inaccuracy, and 
without attempting to present Mehau's response. The 
distinction between the facts in Edwards and the facts 
here, according to Mehau, deprives UPI of the right to 
rely upon the neutral reportage doctrine. 
The Court cannot agree. The undisputed facts indi-
cate that Stone did make adequate efforts to verify the 
Valley Isle story. His stories did no more than repeat 
only that which he had verified; as noted above, he re-
ported only that individuals (who he named) had made 
statements to the Valley Isle, and that the Valley Isle had 
published those statements. In light of the constitutional 
concerns underlying the neutral reportage doctrine, the 
Court finds these efforts legally sufficient. 
As for Stone's duty to report "both sides," [**24] it 
appears to the Court that such an obligation is essen-
tially an incident of the requirement, clearly expressed 
in Edwards, that a reporter not espouse or concur in the 
matter reported. nl7 See, e.g., Cianci, 639 E2d 54 at 
69 (failure to report both sides, including the withhold-
ing of information in author's possession, effectively 
caused report to espouse charges). Accordingly, such 
an obligation does not arise when, as here, the report 
is itself essentially factual, neutral and accurate. nl8 
Clearly, reporting "both sides" may eliminate any risk 
that a report will be construed as endorsing a reported 
charge; but when, as here, reporting both sides adds 
nothing to the neutrality of a simple and straightforward 
story, it is not (or should not be) required. A close 
reading of Edwards ~ appropriate in light of Mehau's 
reliance upon the literal language of the opinion - makes 
clear that, in Judge Kaufman's view, reporting both sides 
is not a prerequisite to the neutral reportage defense; the 
fair, accurate and neutral reiteration of the charges is 
the key. In the Court's view, Stone's reports were that: 
fair, accurate and neutral. Good journalistic practice 
certainly [**25] suggests reporting all aspects of a con-
troversy, and Stone's releases would have been better 
had they contained opposition to the Valley Isle story. 
But the absence of such opposition, at least under these 
circumstances, does not deprive UPI of the right to rely 
upon the neutral reportage doctrine. 
nl7 See Edwards, 556 E2d at 120 ("a publisher 
who in fact espouses or concurs in the charges made 
by others, or who deliberately distorts these state-
ments to launch a personal attack of his own on a 
public figure, cannot rely on a privilege of neutral 
reportage"). 
nl8 Clearly, this rule cannot be absolute; the more 
factually involved and one-sided a report is, the 
greater becomes the reporter's obligation to report 
both sides of the story. The reports in this case, 
however, can hardly be characterized as involved: 
they were one paragraph statements of the fact that 
charges had been made. 
What we are left with, then, are two reports that ac-
curately and neutrally reported serious charges made 
against a public figure regarding a matter of great pub-
lic [*331] interest. nl9 Regardless of the accuracy of 
the underlying charges, the Court is of the view that 
Stone's decision to distribute [**26] those stories over 
the UPI wire is absolutely protected under the neutral 
reportage doctrine. Summary judgment in UPI's favor 
is appropriate. 
nl9 Mehau also argues that the neutral reportage 
doctrine, as articulated in Edwards, requires that the 
reported charges must relate to a long-standing dis-
pute of great public interest. He contrasts the facts 
of Edwards, in which the dispute over DDT use had 
been raging for a number of years, with this case, in 
which, he claims, there had been little prior public 
interest in the subject matter of Stone's report. Yet, 
a fair reading of Edwards in no way indicates a re-
quirement that the issues raised have been in the pub-
lic eye for an extended period of time. Concededly, 
Judge Patel in Barry seems to require that there be 
an "existing public controversy" before a defendant 
can invoke the privilege. 584 E Supp. at 1127. 
To the extent Barry can be read to impose such a 
requirement, however, this Court declines to follow 
that portion of Judge Patel's analysis. So long as 
charges are serious and "newsworthy," Edwards, 556 
E2d at 120, the press should enjoy the freedom to 
report them without regard for the "history" of the 
dispute. Again, the public - and not the press or 
judges - should be the final arbiters of the merits of 
reported charges. 
[**27] C. CONCLUSION 
The Court agrees with Mehau that the Supreme 
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Court of Hawaii's decision on the actual malice issue 
forms the law of the case and should not be disturbed. 
Nevertheless, with respect to issues not addressed by 
the Supreme Court of Hawaii, the undisputed facts in-
dicate that Mehau has failed to prove by a fair prepon-
derance of the evidence that Stone's reports are false. 
Further, the undisputed facts indicate that Stone's reports 
are absolutely protected under the neutral reportage doc-
trine, which the Court adopts herein for the first time in 
this circuit. Accordingly, the Court will grant summary 
judgment in UPI's favor. n20 An Order shall issue. 
n20 Mehau also asks that further discovery be per-
mitted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) before a ruling 
on UPI's motion for summary judgment. This lit-
igation, however, has been alive for over 12 years 
(albeit with a stay of several years on account of 
UPI's bankruptcy). This period has provided am-
ple time within which the parties could have under-
taken all necessary discovery. The only legal issue 
which could conceivably have "surprised" Mehau is 
the Court's decision under Hepps, which arguably 
established a new federal rule of decision in 1986. 
Yet, Mehau's own brief states his view that the Hepps 
rule "has always been the law and certainly does 
not represent a dramatic shift in determining how 
defamation cases should be resolved." Mehau Mem. 
at 18. There is accordingly no basis for further post-
poning a decision on the merits in this action. 
[**28] Date: September 1, 1989 
